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Recognizing the Dualism to Overcome It: the Hybridization of
Reality
Fabio Valenti Possamai
University of North Texas
Introduction – A Hybrid Life
Bruno Latour’s project attempts to overcome the dualism between nature and
culture that still persists in our world. My focus will reside on three of Latour’s books,
namely, We Have Never Been Modern, Reassembling the Social, and An Inquiry into Modes
of Existence. Since the way we live our lives greatly influences the way we think and,
consequently, our philosophical positions, it is important to say something about Bruno
Latour’s biography. His life was extremely inter and transdisciplinary, a strong reason for
his work to be so non-orthodox (Blok and Jensen 8).
Latour was born in 1947 in a small town called Beaune, in the Eastern part of
France. He was first trained as a philosopher and then as an anthropologist. After field
studies in Africa and California he specialized in the analysis of scientists and engineers at
work, spending a little more time inside the laboratory walls. In addition to work in
philosophy, history, sociology and the anthropology of science, he has collaborated on
many studies in science policy and research management. This corroborates the
importance of breaking the mold imposed by academia, in which two things rise to
predominance, namely, disciplinarization and specialization (Blok and Jensen 131).
Latour rose in importance following the 1979 publication of Laboratory Life: the
Social Construction of Scientific Facts. In the book, Latour undertakes an ethnographic
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study of a neuroendocrinology research laboratory at the Salk Institute. This early work
argued that naïve descriptions of the scientific method, in which theories stand or fall on
the outcome of a single experiment, are inconsistent with actual laboratory practice. In
the laboratory, Latour came to the conclusion that a large part of scientific training
involves learning how to make the subjective decision of what data to keep and what data
to discard. Moreover, Latour argued that the entire process resembles not an unbiased
search for truth and accuracy but a mechanism for ignoring data that contradicts scientific
orthodoxy. Drawing on the work of Gaston Bachelard, Latour advanced the notion that
the objects of scientific study are socially constructed within the laboratory. Furthermore,
they cannot be attributed with an existence outside of the instruments that measure them
and the minds that interpret them. And that’s probably one of the core ideas for Latour’s
concept of hybrid (Serres 183).
The redundancy of epistemology is well established by flourishing sociological,
historical and (other) philosophical analyses of knowledge, despite its constant assertion
(directed in particular at the work of Bachelard and his French followers) of the
impossibility of these disciplines. It is not that we need to apportion subject matter
between epistemology and naturalistic studies of science and technology; the work of the
latter is a dissipation of the former. So Laboratory Life is neither an attempt to develop an
alternative epistemology nor is it an attack on philosophy. Perhaps the best way to express
our position is by proposing a ten-year moratorium on cognitive explanations of science
(Latour and Woolgar 280).
In the late 1980s and 1990s,Latour was one of the main exponents of the actornetwork theory. The actor-network theory maps relations that are simultaneously
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material (between things) and semiotic (between concepts) –it’s a hybrid theory. It
assumes that many relations are both material and semiotic. For example, the interactions
in a school involve children, teachers, their ideas, and technologies (such as tables, chairs,
computers and stationery). Together these form a single network – and we might say that
this “network” would consist in a hybrid reality. There is no actor without a network
where he could play and live, and there is no network without its components. Actornetwork theory aims to explain how material-semiotic networks come together to act as a
whole (for example, a school is both a network and an actor that hangs together, and for
certain purposes acts as a single entity). Even though Latour is applying the same
hybridity principle, we still can see that a hybrid always is formed by two things that
become one. You cannot have a hybrid if you have only one element.
My aim here is to demonstrate that we must recognize the dualism between
nature and culture in order to overcome it. We need to make it explicit to properly deal
with it. It is important to notice, however, that this dichotomy would not involve a
hierarchy –a mistake we usually make and that has caused us a lot of trouble. Latour and
his concept of hybrid will provide the theoretical basis for this endeavor. Nature cannot be
culture and culture cannot be nature, since they are not the same thing. Nevertheless,
they share the same territory and they act as a unity – even though their essences come
from a different place. After all, this is what a hybrid is, two (or more) things acting as
one.
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After All, What Does it Mean to be Modern?

In his book We Have Never Been Modern, Latour takes aim at the very ‘essence’, if
this concept can be used, of the modern Western human being. He attacks not just
modernism, but anti-modernism and post-modernism at the same time. He tackles the
underlying premises (as he perceives them) of the modernist world view. We no longer
live in a Modern world per se –we are already one step ahead of it.
Latour explains his provocative title by claiming that the view we have of our
Western culture is false; for while we think we have been modern, in reality, we have not.
He begins by discussing Shapin and Shaffer’s book (Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes,
Boyle and the experimental life) as a starting point. Latour admires Shapin and Shaffer’s
work; however, he regards it as a somewhat flawed attempt. Unfortunately, they were not
able to see it through and go further to reach the crucial point, the kernel of this issue,
i.e., an examination of the basis of modernism. In a Cartesian sense, ‘the foundations of
this building called Modernity.’
The question we should ask ourselves is “what does it mean to be modern, after
all?” Latour claims that modernism is founded upon two key distinctions. One would be
a separation of Nature (non-human) and Culture (human). The other would be a
distinction between the ‘work of purification’ (the classic separation between Nature and
Culture, where nature would be this impure substrate, dirty, confusing, chaotic and
culture would be this ‘purifying angel’, bringing order to chaos) and the ‘work of
translation’ (the creation of Nature/Culture and hybrids/networks systems). These two
distinctions, he claims, are the cornerstones of being modern. This all makes sense since
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we, as human beings, have a historical tendency to thinking in a dualistic way – even
among Eastern traditions we would observe this fact (one good example is the Yin and
Yang). Even though it is not deeply dualistic as our ontological division, the Yin and the
Yang are two components of a whole. There is no harsh division between them, there is
no hierarchy; nonetheless, they still are two different aspects of one reality.
That society stands in the way of sociology and of politics is not so surprising for
those of us in science studies who saw earlier how nature, too, stood in the way. Both
monsters are born in the same season and for the same reason: nature assembles nonhumans apart from the humans; society collects humans apart from the non-humans. As
I have shown elsewhere at length, both are twin freaks generated to stifle the very
possibility of a rightful composition of the collective (Latour, “Reassembling the Social“
164).
The basis for Latour’s claim that we have never been modern is that the work of
translation is not really distinct from the work of purification, and that modernism has
thrived due to the proliferation of hybrids (which will be non-explicit). And this seems to
be a tricky part, since the separation and the hybridization would not be different from
one another. They could be seen as two sides of a coin –or even as the same side of this
coin.
Hence the final question, which is also the most difficult one: if we have stopped
being modern, if we can no longer separate the work of proliferation from the work of
purification, what are we going to become? Can we aspire to Enlightenment without
modernity? My hypothesis - which, like the previous ones, is too coarse --is that we are
going to have to slow down, reorient and regulate the proliferation of monsters by
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representing their existence officially. Will a different democracy become necessary? A
democracy extended to things? (Latour, “We Have Never Been Modern” 12).
From this question we are able to move towards another question: How is it
possible to question modernism and see its weaknesses? Latour views modernism as
having reached a point where it is collapsing under its own weight, like what once
happened to the Roman Empire. The multiplication of hybrids results in the extension of
the one-dimensional line between Nature and Subject/Society (or Culture) into a second
dimension. This two-dimensional space is where ‘quasi-objects’ and ‘quasi-subjects’ exist.
Therefore, my point is that we would not have objects and subjects, in this very distinct
and clear way, but ‘quasi-things.’ These two instances are constantly creating one another.
It is, in the way I see it, a very phenomenological approach. There is no subject and
object, only the relation between the two.
Quasi-objects are in between and below the two poles, at the very place around
which dualism and dialectics had turned endlessly without being able to come to terms
with them. Quasi-objects are much more social, much more fabricated, much more
collective than the 'hard' parts of nature, but they are in no way the arbitrary receptacles
of a full-fledged society (Ibid. 55).
Latour questions the asymmetry of anthropologists who examine other cultures
with a critical eye but then turn a blind to their own (Western) culture. Latour sees this
Western view of itself as being different from other cultures, as being unique, as a result
of the modernist separation of Nature and Culture. This internal divide, as he puts it,
results in an external divide between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ –we would be better, superior,
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advanced, and they would be a primitive people. We are right and they are wrong. Our
cultural bias needs to be fixed, and this could be achieved via the concept of networks.
In my opinion, we could use Latour’s work to go beyond this dualism. For
instance, environmental ethicists roughly divide themselves into two groups:
anthropocentrists and ecocentrists. We all know that this division is much more complex,
though. However, it will help us understand what is at stake here. We cannot say that
culture equals nature; nevertheless, we can say that both work at the same time and on
the same level. We cannot be completely anthropocentrists or completely ecocentrists.
We are a product of nature and culture. We are their hybrid, if you will. Furthermore, it is
not possible to have a hybrid if we only have one thing. That is why we, in order to
overcome this dichotomy, must first recognize it. This is the reason why I chose Latour.
My idea is that the concept of hybrid is a much better explanation than a strong
separation between nature and culture, or the subsuming of them into this ‘one thing.’

A Network of Hybrids and Modes of Existence
In 2005, Latour shifted a little the focus of his work. He became more interested
in relationships between actors and their respective networks. In Reassembling the Social,
Latour developed what he calls a practical metaphysics, which calls real anything that an
actor (any subject of our study) claims as a source of motivation for action. So if someone
says, “I was inspired by God to be charitable to my neighbors,” we are obliged to
recognize the ‘ontological weight’ of their claim, rather than attempting to replace their
belief in God’s presence with “social stuff,” like class, gender, imperialism, and so forth.
Latour’s nuanced metaphysics demands the existence of a plurality of worlds, and the
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willingness of the researcher to chart ever more. Latour tries to build a bridge pervading
hybrids as well as actor and networks. In this same book, he gives a very good example of
what a hybrid would be.
Take, for instance, the case of the platinum kilogram maintained by the
International Bureau of Weights and Measures (Bureau International des Poids et Mesures)
in a deep vault inside the Breteuil Pavillon at the Sevres park outside of Paris. Is it a
convention? Yes. Is it a material object? Yes. Is it an international institution? Once
more, yes. Does it represent the head of a metrological chain, the ideal model to which all
other inferior copies are compared in a solemn ceremony once every two years? Again,
yes. There is no doubt that it is a hybrid (Latour, “Reassembling the Social” 228).
For Latour, there is a close relation between actors and hybrids. Actors, according
to him, are not the source of an action but the moving target of a vast array of entities
swarming towards it. To retrieve its multiplicity, the simplest solution is to reactivate the
metaphors implied in the word actor that I have used so far as an unproblematic
placeholder. It is not by accident that this expression is related to the term stage. An
actor, therefore, is what is made to act by many others – whether they be humans or nonhumans, it does not matter. That is precisely my point here. Therefore, an actor does not
necessarily need to be a human subject. An actor is anything that has the power to
transform and to provoke consequences upon our life –it could an instrument, or a
structure, for instance.
Because it’s not a tool, or rather, because tools are never ‘mere’ tools ready to be
applied: they always modify the goals you had in mind. That’s what ‘actor’ means. Actor
Network (I agree the name is silly) allows you to produce some effects that you would not
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have obtained by some other social theory. That’s all that I can vouch for. It’s a very
common experience. Just try to draw with a lead pencil or with charcoal, you will feel the
difference; and cooking tarts with a gas oven is not the same as with an electric one (Ibid.
143).
The Actor-NetworkTheory was a necessary step towards Latour’s most ambitious
movement, namely, to answer the question he made in his book We Have Never Been
Modern. His latest book, called An Inquiry into Modes of Existence1, represents somewhat a
shift from the thesis stressed in his book about theActor-NetworkTheory. The book
offers a positive version to the question raised, only negatively, with the publication of We
Have Never Been Modern. The question is: if ''we'' have never been modern, then what
have ''we'' been? From what sort of values should ''we'' inherit? In order to answer this
question, a research protocol has been developed, which is very different from the ActorNetwork Theory. The question is no longer only to define ''associations'' and to follow
networks in order to redefine the notion of ''society'' and ''social'' (as in Reassembling the
Social), but to follow the different types of connectors that provide those networks with
their specific tonalities. Those modes of extension, or modes of existence, account for the
many differences between law, science, politics, and so on. This systematic effort for
building a new philosophical anthropology offers a completely different view of what the
''Moderns'' have been and thus a very different basis for opening a comparative
anthropology with the other collectives –precisely at the time when they all have to cope
with the inescapable ecological crisis.
What Latour is trying to create in his latest project is an anthropology of the
Moderns. The history of modernity is based on the shared feeling that there exists an
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arrow of time that moves forward (in a linear way), thus defining a front line that
differentiates an archaic past from a more advanced future – good or bad depending on
what versions we use (but usually we see the past as ‘primitive in a bad, almost inferior,
way’). This moving frontier is largely based on a certain idea of scientific inquiry which
may be summed up by the sentence: yesterday we were still mixing up our ideas about the
world and what the world is really like, tomorrow we will no longer confuse these, and we
will know for sure the difference between the two. The difficulty inherent to this
conception of the modernist experience comes from the surprising fact that what happens
in reality is exactly the opposite: the more we move on, the more entangled we become
with a greater number of entities which cannot be neatly distinguished between what
belongs to society and politics and what belongs to the ‘natural order’ of ‘matters of fact’.
Thus, the arrow of time, instead of leading to emancipation, increasingly hinders and
confuses our existence.
The sudden irruption of the word anthropocene in public discourse could serve as
an emblem of this contradiction: just at the time when scholars were talking of ‘posthumanism’, humans make a surprising comeback but in a totally different role, as a
geological force equivalent to those of plate tectonics.1 Hence the choice summarized and
expressed by the phrase “between modernizing and ecologizing, one has to choose”. Such
a complete disconnect between two totally opposite versions of the modernist's arrows of
time would not be of much consequence if it had not rendered it impossible to
understand the other collectives encountered in the course of history.
1

“Anthropocene” is used to define, similar to the geological eras, a period of time in which the
human being is the predominant force in our planet.
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The “others” are of course a very different type of “other”, and they would depend on
which version of modernity one chooses to stress. If it is the emancipatory moving
forward, the others appear necessarily archaic since they keep confusing the order of the
world with their set of social values –they would be the “primitive ones”. In other words,
they appear to those who conquer them as multiple cultures while the conquerors have a
culture, to be sure, but also an access to one unified nature. But the baseline for such a
comparative anthropology is entirely different if, instead of the emancipatory master
narrative, one were to choose the alternative telling that stresses a history of implication
and attachment around multiplied matters of concern: then the “others” stop being totally
other and begin to appear as companions in a long history that has collected humans and
nonhumans in various assemblages and at various scales.
The odd notion of multiple cultures disappears along with that of ‘one nature’. A
very different past, a very different future, and a very different comparison between
collectives become possible. While the first ideal of modernization is not sustainable
because of the denial of entanglement it implies and this strange exoticism it generates on
the others as well as on itself, another project becomes at least thinkable if a more realistic
narrative of the modernist project is offered. But in order to fight all exoticisms, including
Occidentalism, one cannot be satisfied with the negative conclusion that “we have never
been modern”. Even though such a slogan might be liberating at first, it quickly leads to
the question: “then, what, after all, have we been?” And this other question raised
everywhere by those we have attempted to modernize: “What have you been doing
instead?”
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In order to answer those queries positively and not only negatively, it is necessary
to start, as already have been stressed here, an anthropology of the Moderns. Such an
inquiry was started a quarter of a century ago with a dual research program the two lines
of which have run in parallel. The first one, known by the label of Actor-Network
Theory, has tried to redescribe each of the central institutions of contemporary societies
by following the heterogeneous network of associations that make them up. The
successful development of science and technology studies has provided us with a totally
different version of what was described before as ‘the advance of reason’. In each case, it
has been shown that the grand narrative of modernization does not do justice to the very
institutions developed by the Moderns. And yet, no matter how rewarding has been the
following of those heterogeneous networks of associations, no matter how fecund has
been the redescription of the central domains of modern societies in term of actornetworks, they have not been able to offer the positive version of modernism that we were
looking for.
Networks are great to break down the artificial boundaries established between
domains, but they fail to qualify adequately what the differences are between different
sets of values that could account for the originality of the modernist adventure. Such an
inquiry into modes of existence feeds on the research on networks, but tries to qualify the
mode in which those networks expand. Even though, to take an example, legal practice is
made of many ingredients that come from all sorts of extralegal sources, there is
nonetheless a legal way to attach them to one another, and it is this peculiar way that
legists will try to define when they search for the difference between a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’
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judgment. It is the search for those connectors that are called modes of extension or
‘modes of existence’.
It seems that those who define themselves as possessed by rationality have defined
reason in the worst possible way: a transport without transformation, a direct access to
truth without any mediation. As a consequence, every practice, by comparison with this
ill-adjusted standard, becomes a lie: religion, law, fiction, but also, strangely enough,
science and technology as well. The paradox is that by considering knowledge as the
supreme value, the Moderns have rendered the production of this “unknowable thing”,
hence the deep obscurity that the Moderns have generated about themselves. Those who
constantly speak of enlightenment have obscured the many sources of reason. Things
begin to change, however, as soon as each set of practices is interpreted in its own
language and allowed to define truth and falsity according to its own touchstone.
The past was a barbarian medley; the future, a civilizing distinction. To be sure,
the moderns have always recognized that they too had blended objects and societies,
cosmologies and sociologies. But this was in the past, while they were still only premodern. By increasingly terrifying revolutions, they have been able to tear themselves
away from that past. Since other cultures still mix the constraints of rationality with the
needs of their societies, they have to be helped to emerge from that confusion by
annihilating their past (Latour, “We Have Never Been Modern” 130).
This is true first of science, once it is freed from the odd epistemology that had
disguised for so long its peculiar set of conditions. As the inquiry progresses, the view of
the modernist project becomes more and more different from the official version offered
by this form of exoticism, Occidentalism, that has made impossible until now any
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comparison with the other collectives because of the lack of an acceptable baseline. As
long as the Moderns are not able to provide a realistic description of themselves and what
their values are, no comparative anthropology is possible. Once they enter into this soul
searching effort, it is possible to think of comparative anthropology as a diplomatic
enterprise where the former Moderns, to the relief of all the former “others”, are no
longer cheating about who they are, what they come from and what they want to achieve.
A welcomed change of behavior just at the moment when they have lost to other
collectives the race for modernization and at the very point when the irruption of the
‘anthropocene’, since the lack of other planets to spare, renders all the modernizing
projects irrelevant anyway. Thus, Earth seems to be already occupied by another entirely
different project that some have named Gaia and that no one, so far, seems able to
reconcile with the plans made by those who are no longer exactly humans but rather
Earthlings.
We could relate Latour’s argument to Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic. Leopold
believed that we are a part of a larger community – the biotic community (Leopold, “A
Sand County Almanac”). However, we may say that the biotic community is a hybrid in a
Latourian sense. We have the human community and the non-human community, and
both would be equally important to said community. Therefore, there would be separate
entities acting together as one, in which no one is better than the other. The hierarchy
does not exist, but nature and culture cannot be subsumed into just one thing. J. Baird
Callicott, drawing from Leopold’s work, proposes an updated Land Ethic, which he
called ‘Earth Ethic”. (Callicott, “Thinking Like a Planet: The Land Ethic and the Earth
Ethic”). Callicott thinks that the Land Ethic was a necessary step towards the creation of
	
  

118 / Green Humanities 1 (2015)
an ecological conscience. However, we need to make it more encompassing –from a land
ethic (regional or local) to an earth ethic (global in scale). As I perceive it, the Earth
Ethic would not rely solely on a natural or a cultural aspect, but on both. That is precisely
the point I am trying to make here. The hybridization would lead to the overcoming of
this dichotomy between nature and culture. There would not be this anthropocentrism
versus ecocentrism scenario.

Concluding Remarks: Hybridization as Ontology

It seems we have an insurmountable problem in our hands. Even when we are
able to clearly perceive that nature and culture are not separated, that they should be one
and the same, something gets in our way. This could be seen in the work of the Italian
philosopher Giambattista Vico. Even though he was living during the 18th century, he
had a very good glimpse at this nature/culture division. One of Vico’s projects was the
attempt to find a necessary starting point to this dichotomy (or dualism) between nature
and culture/society. He had a very integrated project, which covered basically almost all
ontological aspects from the early to the later man –from the state of nature to the social
contract, and how they are related to nature. However, the most important thing for us,
since we are focusing on this nature and culture (society) separation, is that, once we
unveil Vico’s intentions, we acquire a new perspective towards this dichotomy.
For him, since we are human beings, we would not have a ‘choice’ (whether
rational or not) about choosing to overcome this apparent inherent dualism. We become
separated from our natural world for one simple, yet very strong reason; it was because
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this was printed into our metaphysical DNA. Our very ontology would be based in this
dualism –we are beings-in-the-world only because we segregate nature and are segregated
by it.
Hence poetic wisdom, the first wisdom of the gentile world, must have begun in a
metaphysics which was not rational and abstract, like that of the learned today, but
sensed imagined, as that of these first men, devoid of reason and wholly composed of
powerful senses and vigorous imaginations must have been. This metaphysics was their
own poetry, a faculty which, since they were provided naturally with such senses and
imaginations, was innate in them” (Vico 374).
To overcome this problem, the usual mechanism employed is to deny that we
have any kind of division whatsoever. This would consist of the recognition of the nonseparability between nature and culture. But two bodies cannot occupy the same space at
the same time. Perhaps, then, we have, besides a traditional position in which Nature is
objective and a Society is subjective, an objective Society and a subjective Nature. This
change will result in the explicit (no longer hidden) production and reproduction of
hybrids at a slower pace than in modernism. When things are hidden, they can control us
more easily –but when they become explicit, then we can finally stand up and fight them.
So these operations of analysis and synthesis always had three aspects: a
preliminary purification, a divided separation, and a progressive reblending. The critical
explanation always began from the poles and headed toward the middle, which was first
the separation point and then the conjunction point for opposing resources - the place of
phenomena in Kant's great narrative. In this way the middle was simultaneously
maintained and abolished, recognized and denied, specified and silenced. This is why I
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can say without contradicting myself that no one has ever been modern, and that we have
to stop being so (Latour, “We Have Never Been Modern” 78).
The problem with a ‘complete hybridization’ resides, in my opinion, in the fact
that we would reduce everything to this “One Thing” –and, thus, there would be no
culture and no nature whatsoever, since each one has its ontological region within our
reality. However, the very concept of hybrid is telling us something. According to its
etymology, hybrid comes from the Latin word hybrida, meaning the "offspring of a tame
sow and a wild boar", or the "child of a freeman and a slave" (“Hybrid”). The term
entered into popular use in English in the 19th century, though examples of its use have
been found from the early 17th century. These are perfect analogies to represent
hybridization. There can be no “One Thing” when we talk about hybrids. The child of a
freeman and a slave – this fits perfectly our situation, unfortunately. We tend to regard
nature as our slave, especially after Bacon and the Scientific and Industrial Revolutions.
However, I do not see a major setback if we recognize this dualism. The problem is not
the dualism per se, but the way we fail to reconcile our social nature and our natural
society.
Yet this is precisely the amalgam I am looking for: to retain the production of a
nature and of a society that allow changes in size through the creation of an external truth and a
subject of law, but without neglecting the co-production of sciences and societies. The amalgam
consists in using the pre-modern categories to conceptualize the hybrids, while retaining
the moderns' final outcome of the work of purification – that is, an external Nature
distinct from subjects (Latour, “We Have Never Been Modern” 134).
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Nature would also be social, and culture would also be natural. We could,
perhaps, talk about a Nature and a Culture (with capital letters), but they would probably
be just misleading concepts. It would be better if we used nature and culture (without
capital letters) as open concepts. It would be some sort of bi-implication –but then again,
between two different things. What we would need is a non-hierarchical dualism, since it
seems we cannot completely escape the influence of a dualistic thinking. Maybe there is
no way to escape this dualism, but there is a way to escape this hierarchy. A garden, for
instance, is a socio-ecological system, is a construct between these two dimensions –
nature and culture (not Nature and Culture). Therefore, gardens only exist due to an
anthropogenic element. Again, the problem is not the division, but the hierarchy. There
is an interdependency between nature and culture, and for something to be
interdependent there must be at least two elements, which would be dependent upon one
another. There can be no interdependent “whole”.
Even once we have recognized the falseness of the dichotomy between nature and
culture, it is hard to break its hold on our minds and our language; look how often I fall
back on its terms. Our alienation from nature runs deep. Yet even to speak in terms of a
compromise between nature and culture is not quite right either, since it implies a
distance between the two –implies that we are not part of nature. So many of our
metaphors depend on this rift, on a too-easy sense of what is nature and what is “a color
of the spirit”. What we need is to confound our metaphors, and the rose can help us do
this better can help us do this better than the swamp (Pollan, “Second Nature” 97).
Latour once said that networks are great to break down the artificial boundaries
established between domains. We need to bring those barriers down. On one side, there
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is nature; on the other, there is culture. They are like two countries which borders are
constantly causing problems between them. One wants to invade the other and
completely erase the national identity of the other. Barriers between neighbors are not a
good thing to have, since they exchange everything –one country cannot live without the
other. Thus, the very existence of one relies on the existence of the other. If we destroy
one country, the other will perish. However, why do we insist that they are one and the
same? Probably the citizens of “Natureland” are not very happy with that, in much the
same way as the people living in the “Kingdom of Culture” are grumbling about it. They
do not want to be assimilated by the other.
We saw earlier that one of the key concepts for Latour is the one which stresses
the existence of “quasi-things” –a hybrid being a quasi-thing. I propose, thus, that nature
and culture, from now on, acquire this “quasi” characteristic. They are not separated
realms of existence, and they ontologically depend upon the other in order to become
“alive”. Therefore, we must open the borders between these two countries and allow a
free flow of its citizens. And if, one day, they become united under the same banner, for
instance, “The Glorious Republic of the Hybrids” –we will still have different identities
inside this nation. They could share the same territory, have the same limits, and
completely overlap one another. You cannot divide them anymore. However, the people
who once belonged to Natureland will always have their idiosyncrasies, their traditions,
and so on and so forth. The same thing will happen to the people from the Kingdom of
Culture. We must overcome the boundaries between them, since this harsh division
brought us nothing but trouble until now. We always have been on the brink of a terrible
war. If we want to end this conflict once and for all, we should recognize that each one of
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them has its particular ontological reality. Let them be what they are, we should not
impose anything upon them. When we become capable of living within a reality where
dualism does not mean hierarchy anymore, in that particular day, we will finally overcome
this dreary division between nature and culture.
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